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Abstract—Machine learning has been widely applied in wire-
less communications. However, the security aspects of machine
learning in wireless applications have not been well understood
yet. We consider the case that a cognitive transmitter senses
the spectrum and transmits on idle channels determined by a
machine learning algorithm. We present an adversarial machine
learning approach to launch a spectrum data poisoning attack
by inferring the transmitter’s behavior and attempting to falsify
the spectrum sensing data over the air. For that purpose, the
adversary transmits for a short period of time when the channel
is idle to manipulate the input for the decision mechanism of
the transmitter. The cognitive engine at the transmitter is a deep
neural network model that predicts idle channels with minimum
sensing error for data transmissions. The transmitter collects
spectrum sensing data and uses it as the input to its machine
learning algorithm. In the meantime, the adversary builds a
cognitive engine using another deep neural network model to
predict when the transmitter will have a successful transmission
based on its spectrum sensing data. The adversary then performs
the over-the-air spectrum data poisoning attack, which aims to
change the channel occupancy status from idle to busy when
the transmitter is sensing, so that the transmitter is fooled into
making incorrect transmit decisions. This attack is more energy
efficient and harder to detect compared to jamming of data
transmissions. We show that this attack is very effective and
reduces the throughput of the transmitter substantially.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, deep learning,
cognitive radio, exploratory attack, spectrum data poisoning,
spectrum data falsification.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radios support the efficient discovery and use
of the spectrum [1]. Spectrum sensing is one of the key
tasks of cognitive radios to achieve situational awareness.
Cognitive radios analyze the signals received through spectrum
sensing and determine their channel access strategy accord-
ingly. Because of the open and broadcast nature of wireless
communications, the decisions built upon spectrum sensing
results are susceptible to different types of attacks that aim to
force the cognitive radios to make incorrect decisions.
Different attacks on the spectrum sensing decisions in a
cognitive network have been studied in the literature and
various defense techniques have been developed [2].
• Primary user emulation (PUE) attacks decrease the spec-
trum access opportunities of cognitive radios. A defense
mechanism with belief propagation was studied in [3].
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• In a collaborative sensing environment, some cognitive
users may send falsified reports to a decision center.
This corresponds to a spectrum sensing data falsification
(SSDF) attack that aims to degrade the performance
of spectrum sensing. A trust-based defense strategy to
mitigate this attack was studied in [4] by using a common
receiver for data fusion. SSDF attack also applies to
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) where there is no
centralized data fusion center. A consensus-based coop-
erative spectrum sensing scheme to counter SSDF attacks
in cognitive radio MANETs was studied in [5].
• Cognitive radio networks are also susceptible to con-
ventional security threats such as jamming [6], cognitive
interference [7], eavesdropping [8] and noncooperation
[9]. These threats extend from physical layer to higher
layers (e.g., routing in the network layer [10], [11]), and
exploit different levels of uncertainty regarding channel,
traffic, and adversary types [12]–[15].
In this paper, we introduce a new type of attack motivated
by adversarial machine learning, namely the over-the-air spec-
trum data poisoning attack. While the adversary jams the
channel under this attack, its purpose is not to degrade the
data transmission received (as typically assumed in denial-of-
service attacks [16]) but it aims to manipulate the spectrum
sensing data collected so that wrong transmit decisions are
made by using the unreliable spectrum sensing results. Also,
this attack differs from the SSDF attack, since the adversary
does not participate in cooperative spectrum sensing and does
not try to change channel labels directly as in the SSDF attack.
Instead, the adversary injects adversarial perturbation to the
channel in order to fool the transmitter into making wrong
transmit decisions.
Recently, machine learning has been applied for several
cognitive radio tasks such as spectrum sensing [17], spectrum
access [18], [19] and modulation recognition [20]. However,
there are various security concerns regarding the safe use
of machine learning algorithms. For example, if the input
data to a machine learning algorithm is manipulated during
the training or operation (test) time, the output will be very
different compared to the expected results. Adversarial ma-
chine learning studies learning in the presence of adversaries
and aims to enable safe adoption of machine learning to the
emerging applications.
Three broad categories of attacks under adversarial machine
learning are exploratory (or inference) attacks, evasion attacks
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and causative (or poisoning) attacks.
• In exploratory (or inference) attacks [21]–[24], the ad-
versary aims to understand how the underlying machine
learning works for an application (e.g., inferring sensitive
and/or proprietary information).
• In evasion attacks [25], [26], the adversary attempts to
fool the machine learning algorithm into making a wrong
decision (e.g., fooling a security algorithm into accepting
an adversary as legitimate).
• In poisoning (or causative) attacks [27], [28], the adver-
sary provides incorrect information such as training data
to machine learning.
These attacks can be launched separately or combined, i.e.,
causative and evasion attacks can be launched by making use
of the inference results from an exploratory attack [29], [30].
In this paper, we apply adversarial deep learning to launch
an exploratory attack on a cognitive radio as the preliminary
step before intentionally changing the transmitter’s sensing
results by transmitting when there will be a success transmis-
sion if this transmission is not under attack. For that purpose,
the adversary trains a deep neural network. We consider a
canonical wireless communication scenario with a cognitive
transmitter, the corresponding receiver, an adversary, and some
other background traffic. The cognitive transmitter builds a
machine learning model (based on a deep neural network) to
predict the busy and idle states of the channel. The training
data includes
• time-series of spectrum sensing results as features, and
• channel idle/busy status based on the ground truth (the
background transmitter’s on/off state) as labels.
Then this machine learning model is used by the cognitive
transmitter to make transmit decisions. If a transmission is suc-
cessful (i.e., the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
exceeds a threshold), the receiver sends an acknowledgement
(ACK) to the transmitter, which can also be overheard by an
adversary. The adversary performs an exploratory attack to
build a classifier that can predict the outcome of transmissions,
i.e., whether there will be an ACK or not if no attack. Note
that this is not a standard exploratory attack and the classifier
built by the adversary will not be the same as (or similar to)
the classifier used by the transmitter, due to the following two
differences.
• The transmitter and the adversary are in different loca-
tions and thus their sensing results will vary based on
the channel environment and differ from each other. As
a result, the input data to their classifiers will differ.
• The adversary predicts the outcome of transmissions
(‘ACK’ or ‘no ACK’) while the transmitter predicts
channel status (idle or busy). As a result, the output data
of their classifiers will differ.
After building its classifier, the adversary predicts when the
transmitter will have a successful transmission (if no attack)
and performs the poisoning attack, i.e., the adversary transmits
to change the channel status in order to poison (i.e., falsify)
the transmitter’s input (spectrum sensing data) to the machine
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Fig. 1. The network topology.
learning algorithm. The attack considered in this paper is
similar to that in [18], where the adversary also first learns the
transmitter’s behavior (ACK or not) by an exploratory attack
and then performs subsequent attacks. The difference is that in
[18], the adversary performs a jamming attack during the data
transmission phase to make a transmission fail while in this
paper the adversary performs a spectrum data poisoning attack
in the sensing phase such that the transmitter has incorrect
input data to its classifier and makes the wrong decision of
not transmitting. The attack considered in this paper is hard
to detect since it does not directly jam the transmitter’s signal
but it changes the input data to the decision mechanism so
that the transmitter chooses not to transmit when the channel
is indeed idle. Moreover, this attack is energy efficient since
the adversary makes a very short transmission in the sensing
period.
We show that this adversarial deep learning approach results
in an effective attack. In particular, for the scenario studied in
numerical results, only few transmission attempts are made
and the achieved throughput (normalized by the optimistic
throughput by an ideal algorithm to detect every idle chan-
nel) drops from 98.96% to 3.13%, when the spectrum data
poisoning attack is launched.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model. Section III describes the transmit-
ter’s algorithm and shows the performance without an attack.
Section IV describes the adversary’s algorithm and shows the
performance under the attack. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive network that includes a transmitter
T , a receiver R, an adversary A and some background traffic
source B that may transmit its data. The network topology
to generate numerical results is shown in Figure 1. Note that
the designed attack schemes can be directly applied to other
network topologies.
The activities of B are not known a priori and can be
detected via spectrum sensing. Time is divided in slots. Within
each slot, the initial short period of time is allocated by T
for spectrum sensing and the ending short period of time is
allocated for feedback (ACK). The rest of a slot is for data
transmission if no other transmission is detected. The decision
of T is based on a deep neural network (trained by deep
learning) that analyzes sensing results and then determines
the channel status such that the channel is busy if background
traffic is detected and channel is idle otherwise. Each sensing
result is either
• noise with normalized power (when channel is idle) or
• noise plus the received power from background traffic
(when channel is busy).
We assume that the noise and the received power are random
variables with Gaussian distributions.
Data transmission is successful if the SINR at the receiver R
is not less than some threshold, where the interference comes
from the transmissions of B. We assume Gaussian noise at R
and Gaussian channel gain from T to R. The mean value of the
channel gain is calculated based on the free-space propagation
loss model. A receiver sends an ACK for each successful
transmission. The adversary A also senses the channel and
aims to predict whether there will be a successful transmission
(ACK) if no attack. Note that A only detects the presence
of the ACK message but does not need to decode it. The
prediction by A is based on another deep neural network that
is trained by A using deep learning. If A predicts that there will
be a successful transmission, it performs an attack to reduce
the throughput of T .
In this paper, we consider the attack of transmitting in the
initial short sensing period to change the sensing result of T
for the current time slot. Since this sensing result is an input to
T ’s classifier on channel status, T may make a wrong decision,
even if its classifier algorithm was built well.
The advantage of this attack, comparing with the continuous
jamming attack, is that the initial sensing period is much
shorter than the data transmission period. As a result, the
power consumption of this attack is also much less compared
to continuous jamming. In addition, this attack is harder to
detect compared to continuous jamming.
We can design a defense mechanism to prevent such attacks
by noting that the first step of the attack is an exploratory
attack to understand T ’s classifier. Thus, T can take wrong
actions in a controlled manner such that the ‘ACK’ or ‘no
ACK’ results can be changed. As a consequence, the classifier
built by an adversary may not work well and thus the attack
may become less effective.
III. TRANSMITTER’S ALGORITHM
Transmitter T needs to sense the spectrum, identify an idle
channel (the other transmitter is not transmitting), and then
decide when to transmit. T applies deep learning to train a
deep neural network classifier that identifies idle channels.
This classifier is pre-trained using the most recent 10 sensing
results as features and the current channel busy/idle status as
a label to build one training sample. The number of sensing
results used for one sample is potentially a design parameter
for T and can be tuned by T to optimize its performance.
Each sensing result is either a Gaussian noise with normalized
power 1 (when channel is idle) or noise plus the transmit power
from another user gBTP (when channel is busy), where gBT
𝑇’s classifier
Sensing data
Channel status
Fig. 2. The input and output (label) data while training T ’s classifier.
is the channel gain from the other transmitter B to T and P is
the transmission power (noise and the channel gain are random
variables with Gaussian distributions). After observing certain
period of time, T collects a number of samples to be used as
training to build a deep learning classifier.
Figure 2 shows the input data and the labels while building
T ’s classifier. T ’s training algorithm is summarized as follows.
• T collects data over a time period. Denote the sensed
power at time t as pt.
• T builds a training sample {(pt−9, pt−8, · · · , pt), st} for
each time t ≥ 10, where st is the channel busy/idle
condition at time t.
• T divides samples equally to a training set and a test set
and uses one half to train a classifier with deep learning.
Once a classifier is built, T will use it to predict the channel
status and transmit if it predicts the channel as idle. This
prediction algorithm is summarized as follows.
• At time t, T senses channel and obtains power pt. T
builds a test sample (pt−9, pt−8, · · · , pt).
• T uses its classifier to decide on the labels (busy or idle)
and then transmits if the channel is predicted idle.
For this algorithm, there may be two types of errors:
• Misdetection. The channel is busy but it is detected as
idle.
• False alarm. The channel is idle but it is detected as busy.
Transmitter T aims to minimize max{eMD, eFA}, where eMD
and eFA are the probabilities of misdetection and false alarm
at T , respectively. These error probabilities are calculated by
eMD =
nMD
nbusy
and eFA = nFAnidle , where nMD is the number of
misdetections, nbusy is the number of times that the channel
is busy, nFA is the number of false alarms, and nidle is the
number of times that the channel is idle.
We use TensorFlow to build a deep learning classifier for
T . In particular, we use the following deep neural network:
• A feedforward neural network is trained with back-
propagation function by using cross-entropy as the loss
function. The structure of a feedforward neural network
is shown in Figure 3.
• Number of hidden layers is 3.
• Number of neurons per hidden layer is 100.
• Rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used as activation function
at hidden layers.
• Softmax is used as the activation function at output layer.
• Batch size is 100.
• Number of training steps is 1000.
Note that T can further optimize the hyperparameters (e.g.,
number of layers and number of neurons per layer) of its deep
Hidden layer
weight
+
bias
𝜎
activation function
Input 
data
Output
labels
Input layer
Hidden layer Hidden layer
Output layer
Fig. 3. The structure of a feedforward neural network.
𝑇’s classifierSensing data
Predicted 
channel status
𝑇’s defense (optional)
Transmit or not
Fig. 4. T ’s classifier during run-time.
neural network. The block diagram in Figure 4 shows T ’s
operation during the run-time. Note that there is an optional
block of defense, which was discussed in Section II.
Background traffic arrives at another transmitter B at rate
of 0.8 packet per time slot. When B has queued data packet,
it may decide to transmit at rate of 1 packet per time slot and
once it transmits, it will continue until the queue is empty.
The channel gain gBT is a random variable with a Gaussian
distribution and the expected value d−2BT , where dBT is the
distance between B and T . In the simulation setting, the
location of B is (0, 10), the location of T is (0, 0), and the
transmit power at B is 1000 (normalized with respect to the
unit noise power).
T collects 1000 samples (each with the most recent 10
spectrum sensing results and a label (‘idle’ or ‘busy’) and
uses half of them as training data and the other half as test
data. There are 403 busy and 97 idle channels in the test data.
Among them, 3 busy channels are identified as idle. Thus,
eFA = 0%,
eMD = 3/403 = 0.74%.
Both errors are small, showing that T can reliably predict the
channel status.
T transmits data in idle channels detected by its deep
learning classifier. If the SNR (or SINR) at receiver R is
no less than some threshold, R will confirm a successful
transmission by sending an ACK to T . Note that we again
assume a Gaussian noise at R and a Gaussian channel gain
from T (or B) to R.
In the simulation, we set threshold as 3, the location of R
as (10, 0), and the transmit power at T as 1000 (normalized
with respect to the unit noise power). T applies its deep
learning classifier on 500 time slots and makes transmission
decisions. There are 404 busy and 96 idle channel instances
in these time slots. Among them, 2 busy channel instances are
identified as idle and transmissions in these 2 slots fail, while
96 idle channel instances are correctly identified as idle and
transmissions in 95 slots are successful.
To measure the throughput performance of T ’s algorithm,
we compare it with an ideal algorithm that can correctly detect
all idle channels. Thus, the achieved normalized throughput
t is defined as the ratio of the number of successful trans-
missions to the number of slot with idle channel instances.
Without an attack, t is measured as
t = 95/96 = 98.96%.
We also evaluate the success ratio r, which is defined as the
ratio of the number of successful transmissions to the number
of all transmissions. Without an attack, r is measured as
s = 95/(96 + 2) = 96.94%.
We can see that due to small errors to detect busy/idle
channels, T ’s algorithm achieves high values of normalized
throughput and success ratio. Finally, we evaluate the all
transmission ratio a, which is defined as the ratio of the
number of all transmissions to the number of all slots. Without
an attack, a is measured as
a = (96 + 2)/500 = 19.60%.
IV. ADVERSARY’S ALGORITHM
There is an adversary A that aims to reduce transmitter
T ’s performance. As the first step, it needs to launch an
exploratory attack to infer T ’s classifier. In particular, A senses
the spectrum, predicts whether there will be a successful
transmission (if no attack), and performs certain attacks if
there will be a successful transmission. There are four cases:
1) channel is idle and T is transmitting,
2) channel is busy and T is not transmitting,
3) channel is idle and T is not transmitting, or
4) channel is busy and T is transmitting.
Ideally, the last two cases should be rare cases. We assume that
A can hear ACKs for T ’s transmissions (but does not decode
them). A uses the most recent 10 sensing results as the features
and the current feedback (‘ACK’ vs. ‘no ACK’) as the label
to build one training sample. The number of sensing results
used for one sample is potentially a design parameter for A
and can be tuned by A to optimize the impact of its attack.
After observing certain period of time, A collects a number
of samples as training data to build a deep learning classifier
that outputs one of two labels, ‘a successful transmission’
and ‘failed transmission’. Figure 5 shows the input data and
the labels while building the adversary’s classifier. A uses
the same deep neural network structure as T , although it
determines its own weights and biases of the deep neural
network by using its own training data. A can further optimize
the hyperparameters of its deep neural network. A’s training
algorithm is summarized as follows.
• A collects data over a time period. Denote the sensed
power at time t as pt and the label (ACK or not) at time
t as lt.
𝑇’s classifierSensing data at 𝑇 Transmit or not
ACK or not
𝐴’s classifier
Sensing data at 𝐴
Predicted 
channel status
𝑇’s defense (optional)
Fig. 5. The input and output (label) data while training A’s classifier.
• A builds a training sample {(pt−9, pt−8, · · · , pt), lt} for
each time t ≥ 10.
• A divides samples equally to a training set and a test set
and one half to train a classifier using deep learning.
The process of building such a classifier can be regarded
as an exploratory attack, since A aims to build a classifier to
infer the operation of T . The classifier built by A is similar to
T ’s classifier. However, there are the following two differences
between the classifiers built by T and A.
• Due to different locations of T and A and random
channels, the sensing results at T and A differ. Thus,
features for the same sample are different at T and A.
• The labels (classes) are different, i.e., ‘busy’ or ‘idle’ in
T ’s classifier and ‘ACK’ or ‘no ACK’ in A’s classifier.
Once a classifier is built, A uses it to predict whether there
is a successful transmission (if no attack). This prediction
algorithm is given as follows.
• At time t, A senses channel and obtains power pt. A
builds a test sample (pt−9, pt−8, · · · , pt).
• A uses its classifier to decide on a label (ACK or not)
and then attacks if there will be an ACK.
For this algorithm, there may be two types of errors:
• Misdetection. There will be a successful transmission but
A’s classifier predicts that there will not be a successful
transmission.
• False alarm. There will not be a successful transmission
but A’s classifier predicts that there will be a successful
transmission.
A aims to minimize max{e˜MD, e˜FA}, where e˜MD and e˜FA
are the probabilities of misdetection and false alarm at A,
respectively. We use TensorFlow to build a deep learning
classifier for A. The deep neural network structure is the same
as the one used by T (described in Section III). As the features
and labels are different for T and T , they individually train
their deep neural network (i.e., determine their own weights
and biases).
Figure 6 illustrates the attacker’s operation during the run-
time. In the simulation, we set the location of A as (10, 10).
A collects 1000 samples with labels and uses half of them
for training data and the other half for test data. There
will be 95 successful transmissions in 500 test data. Out
of 95 transmissions, 4 are predicted as failed transmissions,
although these transmissions are indeed successful. Among
𝑇’s classifier
Sensing data at 𝑇
under attack
Transmit or not
𝐴’s classifier Sensing data at 𝐴
Predicted
ACK or not
Predicted 
channel status
𝐴’s attack
𝑇’s defense (optional)
Fig. 6. Using A’s classifier for attacks.
TABLE I
RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT ATTACK.
Normalized Success All transmission
throughput t ratio s ratio a
no attack 98.96% 96.94% 19.60%
with attack 3.13% 75.00% 0.80%
405 failed transmissions, 8 of them are predicted as successful
transmissions, although these transmissions indeed fail. Thus,
e˜FA = 8/405 = 1.98%,
e˜MD = 4/95 = 4.21%.
Both errors are small, showing that A can reliably predict the
successful transmissions by T .
With the output of A’s classifier, A performs an attack
by transmitting in the initial short sensing period to change
T ’s sensing result for the current time slot. This sensing
result is one feature of T ’s classifier and thus T may make
a wrong decision, even if its classifier algorithm was built
well. Compared with a continuous jamming attack, this attack
targets the initial sensing period that is much shorter than
the data transmission period. Hence, the power consumption
of this attack is much less than continuous jamming. In the
simulation, the transmit power at A is set as 1000.
For the classifier built in Section III and 500 time slots
considered for transmissions under the attack, 1 busy channel
is identified as idle and the transmission in this slot fails,
while 3 (of 96) idle channels are identified as idle and the
transmissions in these 3 slots are all successful. Thus, the
achieved normalized throughput is
t = 3/96 = 3.13%,
and the overall success ratio is measured as
s = 3/(3 + 1) = 75%,
while only very few transmission attempts are made such that
the all transmission ratio a is measured as
a = (3 + 1)/500 = 0.80%.
As a result, A reduces the throughput of T significantly
from 98.96% to 3.13% and reduces the success ratio from
96.94% to 75%. Table I summarizes the performance of T
with and without an attack, and demonstrates the success of
this attack.
V. CONCLUSION
We applied adversarial machine learning (based on deep
neural networks) to design an over-the-air spectrum sensing
data poisoning attack that manipulates the input data of the
transmitter during the run-time and fools it into making wrong
transmit decisions. The proposed attack is preferable for the
adversary with a power constraint since the adversary only
needs to transmit for a short period of time to manipulate the
transmit decisions of the transmitter. Moreover, it is not easy
to detect such an attack due to the short period of transmit
time. We showed that this attack substantially decreases the
throughput of the transmitter, while forcing it to make few
transmission attempts. The results show the effectiveness of
the proposed spectrum poisoning attack, which raises the need
of new defense mechanisms to protect wireless communica-
tions against intelligent attacks based on adversarial machine
learning.
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